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ankruptcy rates have risen rapidly over the past two decades, most no-
ticeably since approximately 1991, with rates doubling by 1997. To
account for this rise in bankruptcy rates, researchers have advanced
two—perhaps competing—hypotheses. The ﬁrst hypothesis is that the avail-
ability of unsecured consumer credit has expanded to wider, riskier subsets
of the population in response to cost reductions arising from improvements
in technology for monitoring and accounting for borrowers’ activities. Fur-
ther, technological improvements in payment networks have promoted the
widespread adoption of credit cards as a method of payment. The recent
works of Ellis (1998), Athreya (2001), and Moss and Johnson (2002) illus-
trate the phenomenon of rising credit card usage as it relates to increases in
bankruptcy.
A second view, and one that appears commonly held among the general
public, is that bankruptcy has lost its once formidable stigma. Gross and
Souleles (2002) argue that non-risk-related factors have become more impor-
tant in explaining the rise in bankruptcies and attribute this to a fall in stigma.
Fay, Hurst, and White (forthcoming) propose that stigma was higher in the
past and that bankruptcy ﬁling rates were therefore lower. For this reason,
current research is divided on the cause of the rise in bankruptcy rates.
Anecdotally, it is not difﬁcult to ﬁnd reports like the following:
Judge Edith Jones, a former member of the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission, noted in Congressional testimony that “The current system
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Figure 1 Total Bankruptcy Filings, United States, 1991–1997
of bankruptcy law permits any person to seek relief without demonstrating
ﬁnancial necessity. At one time in our history, ﬁling bankruptcy was
regarded as shameful, and ﬁlers suffered social stigma and permanently
ruined credit. The shame and stigma are no longer compelling...many
ﬁlers now commence cases without ever having been in default on their
debts. This suggests that bankruptcy is, to them, not a last resort, but a
ﬁrst resort” (Pomykala 1999).
A recent article in Harvard Magazine (Anderson 1999) also implies that
stigma has fallen by noting that “Industry representatives point to the fact that
personal bankruptcy ﬁlings hit an all-time high of 1.4 million in 1997, during
a period of low unemployment, when consumers were in their best ﬁnancial
shape in many years.”1
The purpose of this article is twofold. First, the work of the preceding
authorsisempirical, not“structural”inthesensethathouseholdsarenotmod-
eledexplicitly. Aninnovationofthisarticleistoprovideaclearexpositionofa
1 This statement is misleading in the sense that while the average household experienced
gains during the 1990s, it is also the case that those in bankruptcy were typically in very difﬁcult
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structural model of lending and borrowing with bankruptcy as well as attempt
to account endogenously for the expansion in unsecured credit availability
and bankruptcy. This article therefore goes beyond that of Athreya (2001),
where the expansion of credit was taken as exogenously given. This analysis
is meant to illustrate how bankruptcy affects demand and supply in the unse-
cured credit market. The second goal of this article is to employ the model to
study the observable implications of the widely held belief that bankruptcy is
far less painful today than it was in the past.
A central challenge for explanations of rising bankruptcy rates based on
falling stigma is that such a feature should generate a supply-side response
whereby borrowing on the unsecured credit market grows more expensive.
That is, if borrowers become more willing to default, lenders will seek higher
interest rates to compensate for the greater default risk. In turn, such a price
increase should be associated with smaller debt holdings across households,
something that is counterfactual for the period under study. I exploit precisely
this implication by studying stigma in a model where creditors must at least
partially respond to borrower characteristics when pricing loans.
In this article I show that decreasing the nonpecuniary cost of bankruptcy,
asafallinstigmaimplicitlydoes, indeedincreasesbankruptcyratesbutyields
counterfactual implications for the time path of debt held by households. I
then address the consequences of making credit more widely “available” by
reducing transactions costs for intermediaries. In particular, I show that min-
imally vigilant creditors and optimizing households will act in a manner that
prevents a fall in stigma from generating the simultaneous rise in bankruptcy
and debt holdings observed in the data. Therefore, a main conclusion of this
article is that stigma is by no means dead. A more plausible explanation for
the simultaneous run-up in both unsecured debt levels and bankruptcy rates
may lie in the implicit reduction in costs of intermediation that occurred over
the past two decades. Fully accounting for the facts, however, remains a task
for future work.
1. THE FACTS
What are the main facts describing bankruptcy rates and their evolution over
the past two decades? Also, have the characteristics of ﬁlers changed during
the period? The data presented here draw heavily on the detailed study of
bankruptcy ﬁlers of Sullivan et al. (2000).
One can immediately see that bankruptcy rates have risen somewhat
steadily over time, with the most spectacular rise coming in the period from
1990 to the present. Figure 1 illustrates the period from 1990 onward.
• Fact1: Bankruptcyratesroughlydoubledduringtheperiod1991–1997.4 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 2 Outstanding Consumer Revolving Debt as a Percentage
of Personal Disposable Income in the United States,
1991–1997
Figure 2 documents a measure of the indebtedness of households over
the same period. The ﬁgure shows the ratio of the stock of revolving debt
to personal disposable income. As is clearly visible, households did become
moreindebtedalongthisdimensionrelativetotheirincomesduringthisperiod.
• Fact 2: U.S. households as a whole sharply increased their holdings of
revolving debt relative to income over the period 1991–1997.
To show a more precise idea of the “proﬁle” of a bankruptcy ﬁler and how
it has changed over time, Sullivan et al. (2000) document statistics on the
characteristics of bankrupt households, presented in Table 1.
Notable in this table is the rise in the ratio of median unsecured debt in
bankruptcy relative to median income at the time of ﬁling.2 In 1991, this ratio
2All debt and income levels are in 1997 dollars.K.Athreya: Stigma and Bankruptcy 5





Standard deviation 14,357 48,461
25th percentile 14,141 8,208
Median 21,155 15,128






Standard deviation 10,482 37,618
25th percentile 12,072 12,368
Median 18,756 19,515
75th percentile 25,748 31,389
N 100 100
Missing 0 0
was roughly 0.75 (i.e., $15,128/$21,155). By 1997, the ratio had exceeded
unity, at $19,515/$18,756.3 Therefore, we have:
• Fact 3: Debt-to-income ratios for U.S. households in bankruptcy in-
creased sharply over the period 1991–1997.
Despite the fall in median income at the time of ﬁling during the period
1991–1997, one should note that median household income for the entire
U.S. population remained essentially ﬁxed, at roughly $40,000 (in current
dollars). While the income process in the model is too discrete to allow an
exact comparison with these statistics, it still will be possible to provide an
approximation of these statistics to help evaluate the predictions of the falling
stigma.
I now develop a simple model of unsecured borrowing and ask if falling
stigma is consistent with the facts documented above. In order for a decline in
stigma to be regarded as a serious explanation for the increase in bankruptcy
ratesbetween1991and1997, reductionsinstigmamustalsogeneratea)sharp
increases in the level of unsecured debt held by households, as well as b) large
increases in the median debt discharged per bankruptcy.
3 By contrast, in 1981, the ratio was slightly less than 0.5, as the median household in
bankruptcy held $12,452 dollars of unsecured debt, relative to a median income of $26,439.6 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
2. A MODEL OF CONSUMER DEBTAND BANKRUPTCY
The model developed here follows Athreya and Simpson (2003), and is an
extension of Athreya (2002). It is richer than the latter in that creditors are
allowed to condition the interest rates they charge according to an approx-
imation of the default risk posed by each loan. Conditioning allows us to
incorporate non-trivial supply side effects on credit availability, which, in
turn, has implications for long-run indebtedness and default rates.
The environment under study consists of a large number of initially iden-
tical households that each receive shocks to their income in every period.
Households cannot perfectly insure their income risk. Instead, they have
access only to risk-free savings and debt that may be discharged subject to
penalties associated with bankruptcy.





Wherect denotesconsumptionwithinaperiod, β deﬁnestherateatwhich
households discount future consumption. In this speciﬁcation, u(.) denotes







1−γ , for γ>1
lnct, for γ = 1.
The parameter γ governs how risk-averse households are, as well as how
smooth they would want consumption to be over time, given prices. In each
period, households draw a random endowment of income, denoted e. The
randomness of income is meant to capture both variations in income among
workingpeople,suchaschangesinovertime,short-termdisability,etc.,aswell
as variations in income arising from becoming unemployed when working,
or re-employed when not. Employed households may receive a shock that
renders them unemployed. The probability of getting this shock is given by
ρ. Once unemployed, the household regains employment in each period with
probability πemp.
Given their preferences, households would like to smooth consumption,
but are assumed not to have access to explicit insurance contracts against their
income risk. Instead, they must smooth consumption by either accumulating
one-period risk-free claims to consumption or by borrowing. When borrow-
ing, however, households are endowed with the option to default, which we
will take as being representative of the formal process of bankruptcy. Before
turning to the deﬁnition of bankruptcy, note that in this environment different
debt levels will be associated with different default risks. Therefore, if ﬁnan-
cialintermediariesareallowedtoobservethetotaldebtissuedbyahousehold,
competition will force ﬁrms to condition on total debt.K.Athreya: Stigma and Bankruptcy 7
Letr(a )denotethenetinterestrateassociatedwiththeamountofsavings
or debt a . Households save by choosing a  > 0, and borrow by choosing
a  < 0. Given that there is no default risk for savings, the interest earned on
savings will not vary with the amount saved and will therefore be simply a
single risk-free rate, which I denote by rd > 0. That is, r(a ) = rd when
a  > 0. On the other hand, households may choose to borrow by issuing debt
thatmaturesnextperiod. However,acentralfeatureofthemodelisthatagents
may default on debt. I therefore follow Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2003)
and model the market for debt as follows.
First, assume competitive ﬁnancial intermediation whereby the savings
of households are taken in and then loaned to large numbers of households.
Assume further that making loans entails transactions costs arising from the
costs of processing applications, veriﬁcation of information, etc. Let the
transactions cost be denoted by τ. In this case, because of the possibility
of default, the debt is effectively discounted so that r(a ) ≥ rd + τ.I n a
given period, a household must choose the amount of one-period borrowing
it desires and then issue a given face-value of debt accordingly. This debt is
thendiscountedatleastattherisk-freerate. Therefore, ifthehouseholdissues
a given face value of debt a  in this period, it receives a smaller amount of
consumption goods a 
1+r(a ) <a  . In the following period, the debt matures,
and the household decides either to honor the debt or to ﬁle for bankruptcy to
be released of its obligation. For large debt levels, where default is relatively
more likely, r(a ) will of course be larger.
In the limit, the household will receive nothing at all if it attempts to issue
debt levels where default in the next period becomes certain, as r(a ) will
approach inﬁnity. This is precisely the sense in which the borrowing limits
faced by households are endogenous, depending on the likelihood that the
household defaults on a given amount of debt. I denote the endogenous credit
limit for solvent households by as.
Upon ﬁling for bankruptcy, households have their debts discharged and
paytwocosts. First, theyarerestrictedfromfutureborrowingforanuncertain
length of time. Speciﬁcally, in each subsequent period, the household has
its ability to borrow restricted with probability (1 − ψ) < 1, resulting in an
averagelengthofrestrictedborrowingof1/(1−ψ)periods. Asecondcostthat
households must pay is the stigma of bankruptcy, represented by an amount
λ subtracted from the household’s utility in the period it ﬁles.
The nature of the problem faced by households is such that if households
deriveagivenvalueV frombehavingoptimallyfromnextperiodonward,then
their choices today are restricted by only a few variables. The ﬁrst variable
is household credit status. In any period, households may be solvent, S, may
have just ﬁled for bankruptcy, B, or may be “borrowing constrained” due to
a past bankruptcy, denoted BC. I denote credit status by the variable CS ∈
{S,B,BC}. Second, households must know their current period earnings, e.
Third, households must know their wealth or debt position, a. The value8 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
V, therefore, is a function of these three pieces of information, which, when
taken together, fully determine the resources available for consumption today.
I therefore denote the “value function” by V(CS,e,a). It is then sufﬁcient
for the household to maximize utility today, taking as given that it will choose
optimally thereafter, obtaining value V(CS ,e  ,a ).
Adapting slightly the notation used in Athreya (2002), we have a simple
representation of the problem. The value of being solvent V(S,e,a),i se x -
pressed as the better of two choices that a solvent household has in a period,
namely, whether to ﬁle for bankruptcy or not. Therefore, V(S,e,a)must
satisfy:
V(S,e,a)= max[W(S,e,a),W(B,e,a)] (1)
where W(S,e,a)denotes the value of not ﬁling for bankruptcy in the current
period. If the household does not ﬁle for bankruptcy, it simply chooses con-
sumption, c, and either saves or issues debt, a , and moves to the next period
as a solvent household.
Therefore, W(S,e,a)satisﬁes:




1 + r(a )
≤ e + a (3)
s.t.
a  ∈ AS (4)
where AS = [as,∞), implying that a household faces an absolute credit limit
of as.
If, on the other hand, a household does choose to ﬁle for bankruptcy, its
debtsareerased,asseenbelowinthemodiﬁedright-handsideofthehousehold
budget constraint, (6), leaving only current earnings for consumption and
savings. The household is also hit by the stigma of ﬁling, λ.I ti sλ that will be
calibrated in the benchmark and then altered. It is the central parameter in the
analysis that follows. In the following period, the credit market is assumed
to shut the household out, and the latter obtains a value V(BC,e,a)from
beginning in this state. The value of ﬁling for bankruptcy in a given period is
then given by:




1 + rd ≤ e (6)
s.t.
a  ∈ ABC. (7)K.Athreya: Stigma and Bankruptcy 9
If a household ﬁles for bankruptcy, it is constrained from borrowing in the
following period. In subsequent periods, the restriction on borrowing ends
with a time-independent probability ψ. The set ABC = [aBC,∞), where
0 ≥ aBC ≥ aS. Given the preceding, the maximal utility attainable by a
borrowing-constrained household satisﬁes equation (8) below, subject to the
constraints in (9) and (10).





1 + rd ≤ e + a (9)
s.t.
a  ∈ ABC. (10)
3. EQUILIBRIUM
It can be shown that the savings and debt instruments allowed here are in
generalinsufﬁcientforhouseholdstofullyprotecttheirconsumptionofgoods
and services from ﬂuctuations in their income. Therefore, as time evolves,
householdswillholddifferentwealthlevelsasafunctionoftheirpastincomes.
Under fairly general conditions, however, the distribution of wealth across
households will converge to a distribution that, once reached, will remain
ﬁxed. I will focus on the allocations associated with this ﬁxed “long-run”
distribution.
Equilibrium further requires that households act optimally; that is, their
decisions must satisfy the recursive representation above, and lenders must
break even. With respect to the latter, a loan of size a carries an associated
default probability θbk(a) and a cost of funds (including transactions costs) of





For those who choose to hold savings, the zero-proﬁt interest rate will simply
be rd.4
4. THE EXPERIMENT
The experiment I conduct is very simple. I ﬁrst set model parameters, chief
among them stigma, such that the model approximately matches bankruptcy
4 I refer the interested reader to Athreya (2002) for more details on the stationary equilibrium
concept employed here.10 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 2 The Change in Bankruptcy and Credit: 1991 and 1997
1991 1997
Bankruptcy rate 0.13% 0.20%
Median debt/income in bankruptcy 38% 50%
Median debt in bankruptcy $15,100 $19,500
Revolving debt/income 5.5% 8.5%
Credit card charge-off rate 0.85% 1.25%
rates,thedebtdischargedinbankruptcy,andcharge-offratesasof1991. Ithen
lower the cost of stigma and ask what the model predicts for bankruptcy rates,
debts discharged in bankruptcy, and interest rates. If the model is consistent
with observed outcomes in 1997, it will provide some support for the idea of
lower bankruptcy stigma in the present than in the past. If not, we will be left
with the puzzle of why the observed changes have occurred. The observed
outcomes as of 1991 and 1997 are given inTable 2. I calculate the bankruptcy
targetasfollows. In1991,therewereapproximately900,000ﬁlings. Ofthese,
70 percent were Chapter 7 ﬁlings, to which the bankruptcy procedure deﬁned
in the model best matches. Further, Sullivan et al. (2000) report that roughly
20 percent of bankruptcies involved health problems, and I have excluded
those cases, as they are better modeled as shocks to “expenses,” as in Livshits
et al. (2003). I therefore target an annual ﬁling incidence of 500,000. Given
the approximately 100 million households in the United States, I obtain a
quarterly ﬁling rate of 0.13 percent. For the ratio of revolving debt to income,
IusedatafromtheEconomicReportofthePresident (2001). Charge-offrates
are taken from Stavins (2000), and the remaining facts are from Sullivan et al.
(2000).
Parameters
The exogenous process for labor income shocks is given below and will take
four different values: Y ∈{ Y1,Y 2,Y 3,Y 4}. These shocks represent a pro-
portional increment or decrement to average productivity. The shocks are set
to allow the interpretation that households are partitioned into those who are
“working,” and those who are “unemployed.” When households are working,
income shocks take values in the set Yw ={ Y1 = 1.15,Y 2 = 0.85}, with
probabilities that depend on the previous period’s shock. In each period, an
employed household may receive a shock that renders it unemployed. The
probability of this shock is denoted by ρ. When they are unemployed, house-
holds will draw income from a set of two substantially lower shocks, Y3 and
Y4, where Y3 >Y 4, and Yj is a positive income amount for all j. The size of
these shocks is set at: Yu ={ Y3 = 0.5,Y 4 = 0.1}. These shock realizationsK.Athreya: Stigma and Bankruptcy 11
Table 3 The Income Process
Employed Y  = Y1 Y  = Y2 Y  = Y3 Y  = Y4
Y = Y1 0.9700 0.0300 0.0000 0.0000
Y = Y2 0.0300 0.9700 0.0000 0.0000
Unemployed < 2 Quarters Y  = Y1 Y  = Y2 Y  = Y3 Y  = Y4
Y = Y3|high productivity 0.6790 0.0210 0.1800 0.1200
Y = Y4|low productivity 0.0210 0.6790 0.1800 0.1200
Unemployed ≥ 2 Quarters
Y = Y3|high productivity 0.6790 0.0210 0.0000 0.3000
Y = Y4|low productivity 0.0210 0.6790 0.0000 0.3000
are interpreted as income received by those who qualify and those who fail
to qualify for unemployment insurance. To avoid keeping track of a separate
shockprocessforunemployedhouseholds,itisassumedthattheyreceivehigh
and low productivity draws even when unemployed from the same process as
employed households. Therefore, if re-employed in the following period,
these households will receive incomes according to the conditional probabil-
ities of low and high productivity shocks given current period productivity.
Lastly, households hit by two or more consecutive periods of unemployment
no longer qualify for unemployment insurance and instead receive the shock
Y4. Table 3 describes the transition probabilities.
Forexpositionalease,Idisplaytheearningsprocessforhouseholds,given
that the employment/unemployment shock has already been realized. The
interpretation of this process is the following: For employed workers, the
process is given by the top two rows of Table 3. Since they are employed
in the current period, they face zero probabilities of drawing income levels
Y3 and Y4. Instead, their productivity remains within the set {Y1,Y 2} and is
drawn according to the corresponding transition probabilities. Next, consider
the process for a newly unemployed worker with currently high individual
productivity. This worker has a probability of 0.679 of becoming employed
with high productivity and a probability of 0.0210 of becoming employed
with low productivity. Additionally, the worker will remain unemployed with
a probability of 0.30 (i.e., 0.18 + 0.12) and will retain high productivity with
probability0.18andlosesproductivitywithprobability0.12. Finally,consider
a worker who is unemployed for at least two periods, as shown in the bottom
two rows of Table 3. Such workers will no longer qualify for unemployment
insurancebeneﬁtsshouldtheyfailtoﬁndwork, whichoccurswithprobability
0.30 in a given quarter. Therefore, these households draw incomes of Y = Y4.
If the household does ﬁnd work, it then draws from the process Yw ={ Y1 =
1.15,Y 2 = 0.85}.12 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 4 The Parameters
Parameter Description Value
γ Risk aversion 1.00
τ Quarterly transition cost of intermediation 0.0085
ρ Unemployment risk (quarterly) 0.05
πemp Probability of re-employment in next period 0.7
1/(1-ψ) Avg. length of post-bankruptcy borrowing limit (qtrs) 16(⇒ ψ = 0.9375)
λ Bankruptcy cost 1.65*
β Quarterly discount rate 0.9865*
aB,a BC Borrowing limit for borrowing-constrained households 0
Table 4 below reports the remaining parameters of the model that, along
with the income process, matches outcomes as of 1991. Asterisks indicate
calibrated parameters. That is, parameters whose values are set such that
the model matches the facts documented above, as of 1991. In 1991, the
unemployment rate was 6.8 percent. The fact that 1991 was the trough of a
business cycle implies that unemployment risk at this time was higher than in
1997. As a result, the benchmark estimate of stigma might be affected by the
valueimputedfortheriskofbecomingunemployed,ρ. However,thedirection
of any bias in measuring stigma under 1991 unemployment rates is unclear,
as there are forces in both directions. Namely, in a world with relatively
highunemploymentrisk,bankruptcyismorecostlythanwhenunemployment
risk is low, as exclusion from credit markets becomes more painful. This
will lead to lower debt holdings for households, all else equal. Conversely,
more unemployment risk means that those with large debts are likely to ﬁnd
themselves in more difﬁcult circumstances than before. It should be noted
thatbiasinestimationofstigmaarisingfromahigherorlowerunemployment
target may arise. Such bias, however, is likely to be second order with respect
to the qualitative changes induced by a large fall in stigma.
The remaining parameters are chosen either with direct reference to the
data, as in the case of τ and ψ, or are set at values made standard in the
literature, as in the case of the risk-aversion coefﬁcient γ and the discount
factor β.5 The stigma-related cost of bankruptcy λ, is a reduction in utility
arising from ﬁling. To be concrete, it is useful to express this reduction in
terms of the consumption good or in dollars. To do this, note that the value
function yields important information on the consequences of a reduction in
current “cash-in-hand” for a household contemplating bankruptcy. Namely,
wecanaskthefollowingquestions: First,whataretheﬁnancialcharacteristics
(i.e., currentearnings, e)ofthemedianbankruptcyﬁlerinourmodel? Forthis
5 For the ﬁrst two parameters, see Athreya (2002) for details.K.Athreya: Stigma and Bankruptcy 13
Table 5 The Benchmark Calibration
1991 Data Model
U.S. quarterly bankruptcy rate 0.13% 0.14%
Median debt/income in bankruptcy 38% 34%
Median debt in bankruptcy $15,000 $13,700
Revolving debt/income 5.2% 6.2%
Unemployment rate 6.8% 6.9%
Credit card charge-off rate 1% 0.76%
value of earnings, how much would current earnings, e, have to be reduced
in order for an optimizing household to ﬁnd its utility lowered by λ units?6
This value turns out to be approximately $4,000. Therefore, bankruptcy is not
taken lightly by households. This is also consistent with the work of White
(1998) who ﬁnds that while 15 percent of households would ﬁnd it ﬁnancially
beneﬁcial, less than 1 percent do ﬁle in any given year.
5. RESULTS
In the benchmark case, we see that the model matches up quite well with the
data along several dimensions, even though there are more targets than “free”
parameters. In particular, with respect to credit market facts, I attempt to
match the data along three dimensions: 1) the U.S. quarterly bankruptcy rate,
2) the ratio of median debt to median income among bankruptcy ﬁlers as well
as the dollar value of the debt, 3) the ratio of total revolving debt to income for
the United States, 4) the unemployment rate, and 5) the quarterly loss-rate or
“charge-off” rate for credit cards—the predominant form of unsecured debt.
6 More precisely, we compute the following: let x ={ CS,a,e} be any value for the state
vector, and let emed be the median value for earnings among those ﬁling for bankruptcy. Given
our notation, the expected discounted utility from ﬁling for bankruptcy is then given by:




1 + rd ≤ emed (13)
s.t.
a  ≥ aBC (14)
With this, we can solve for the reduction in income such that optimizing under the remaining
income, e∗, would yield utility level, W(B,emed,a). This will tell us how costly in real terms
the penalty is to a representative member of the group who receives penality costs. In the model,
the median unemployed household earns a median income of approximately 0.5 units. The median
ﬁler, on the other hand, receives an income of 0.1 units. This difference of 0.4 units of current
earnings produces a utility drop of roughly 1.5 units. In dollar terms, 0.4 is 40 percent of quarterly
earnings or $4,000.14 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Given that the benchmark model captures many of the salient features of
bankruptcy,unemployment,andcredit,Inowevaluatetheeffectofareduction
in “stigma,” denoted by the parameter λ. In order to avoid further lowering
bankruptcy by lowering the unemployment rate, I leave the probability of
unemployment, ρ, ﬁxed, even though 1997 was characterized by a lower
unemployment rate than 1991. If the model is still unable to generate an
increase in bankruptcy as stigma falls, this will provide a more compelling
argument against the stigma-based explanation for the observed changes. In
the results above, λ is cut from its 1991 benchmark value of 1.65 to a value
of 0. Beyond exclusion from credit markets, there is assumed to be no cost to
bankruptcy whatsoever. This change in stigma, while perhaps stark, is useful




in generality by considering the limiting case. I eliminated exclusion from
creditmarketsaspartof“stigma”becausethecommoninterpretationofstigma
involves personal nonpecuniary suffering associated with the decision to ﬁle
for bankruptcy.
It is seen that bankruptcy rates do rise, almost to levels observed in 1997.
Therefore, the hypothesis that there has been a loss in stigma is not yet con-
tradicted. However, what has happened to credit “supply” relative to the
benchmark is striking. Table 6 shows that the endogenous borrowing limit,
“as,” is only approximately $1,100, or less than three percent of annual me-
dian income. In essence, the unsecured credit market nearly disappears. By
contrast, when the stigma of bankruptcy is set at the 1991 benchmark level,
the endogenous limit on unsecured debt rises dramatically to the equivalent
of one-third of annual income, or roughly $14,000. The debt discharged in
bankruptcy under low-stigma falls to nearly zero. In this low-stigma environ-
ment, households rarely borrow, but when they do, they often default. The
latter is seen in the quarterly charge-off rate, which at nearly 13 percent is
wildly at odds with the roughly 1 percent rate observed in the period since ap-
proximately1996. Theresultsforcreditloanratesarepredicatedonacreditor
whocanobservetotaldebt. Totheextentthatlenderscouldobservemore, one
might expect the effects on supply to be even more severe than reported here.
Intuition
Tohelpexplainthedecisionmakingofhouseholds,itisimportanttounderstand
households’ willingness to acquire debt and, in turn, pay premia associated
both with transactions costs and with default risk. In particular, the beneﬁts
of asset accumulation and decumulation to smooth consumption are signiﬁ-
cantly reduced when shocks are very persistent—or when they are very large
inmagnitude. Forenvironmentssimilartothepresentone,butwithoutdefault,K.Athreya: Stigma and Bankruptcy 15
Table 6 The Effect of a Fall in Stigma
1991 1997
λ 1.65 0.00
Bankruptcy rate 0.13% 0.18%
Median debt/income in bankruptcy 34% 0.85%
Median debt in bankruptcy $13,700 $340
Revolving debt/income 6.2% 0.2%
Credit card charge-off rate 0.8% 12.9%
as $14,000 $1,100
households can typically do a great deal of consumption smoothing without
ever borrowing. For example, the classic work of Aiyagari (1994) demon-
strates that for even very persistent (but not permanent) shocks, the additional
amount of assets households accumulate relative to the full-insurance case is
small. This ﬁnding is important for understanding why a reduction in the cost
of bankruptcy leads, in equilibrium, to a substantially lower availability of
credit. I now discuss the decision rules of households with respect to debt in
the two environments.
Intuitively, in order for a reduction in stigma to generate increased bank-
ruptcy ﬁlings, the “supply” effect in terms of the loan-rate schedule must be
attenuatedsothathouseholdsarestillableandwillingtoobtaincreditcheaply
and to discharge these debts at relatively higher rates than with higher stigma.
For households to be willing to pay large premia to obtain credit, they must be
likely to default or in dire circumstances, or both. However, for empirically
plausiblespeciﬁcationsofincomerisk,householdsinthemodelcaneffectively
smooth consumption even without access to credit markets. Therefore, if a
household in such an environment were given the same amount of credit as
before (i.e., as much as in a “high stigma” world), they would now be far
more likely to default on the debt. In turn, the competitive price for such
a loan would rise substantially. If adequate consumption smoothing is then
possible without recourse to borrowing, most households will be unwilling
to pay large premia to borrow. Therefore, as stigma falls, equilibrium debt
holding falls drastically even while bankruptcy rates rise. The central point
therefore is that the “supply” side response of credit to costs of bankruptcy
is intimately connected to how well consumers may smooth consumption
without borrowing.
The central question now becomes: since falling stigma appears entirely
unequal to the task of explaining the facts, is there a plausible alternative
explanation? Improvements in technology for intermediating credit is one
prominent possibility, which I now explore.16 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
WhatAbout Competition and Technological Change
in Unsecured Lending?





introduced by VISA in 1992 and, more visibly, the vast array of co-branded
cards offering frequent ﬂyer miles and other rebates that effectively lower the
price of unsecured credit. These reductions in the marginal costs of credit
supply are also consistent with the substantial entry to credit card lending
that took place in the period 1991–1995 and, in turn, greatly increased the
number and variety of credit card contracts offered, as well as the debt taken
on by households.7 Edelberg (2003) documents very clearly that the extent to
which creditors now are able to engage in risk-based pricing has increased. In
particular, she ﬁnds a large increase in the variance in interest rates charged to






have fallen for a large population, which is what leads them to borrowing on
mainstreamunsecuredcreditmarkets, asopposedtoeitherbeingdeniedcredit
or borrowing from more expensive alternatives such as check-cashing outlets
or pawn shops. As Edelberg (2003) argues, in the current environment, “we
expect to see that very high risk borrowers are able to get credit ...instead of
simply being denied.”
The parameter τ represents transactions costs, broadly deﬁned. These
costs may be associated with both innovations in the technology of credit
services and more competitive lending.8 The natural experiment is therefore
to lower τ, (set to 0.0085). To be extreme, I now evaluate outcomes for the
case where τ = 0. The results are presented in the second line below. In the
second line of Table 7, I present the results that isolate the impact of tech-
nological change in intermediation alone, whereby I reinstate the benchmark
non-pecuniary cost of bankruptcy of λ = 1.65, but drop the transactions cost
τ to zero.
7 See Evans and Schmalensee (1999).
8 To the extent that lending became more competitive post-1991, the purely competitive zero-
proﬁt condition in the 1991 benchmark is not quite correct. However, it is likely to be a useful
approximation and allows us to reduce τ and interpret this meaningfully as a reduction in margins.K.Athreya: Stigma and Bankruptcy 17
Table 7 The Effect of Lower Transactions Costs (τ = 0)
1991 τ = 0 τ = 0
λ 1.65 1.65 0.00
Bankruptcy rate 0.14% 0.19% (0.20%) 0.20%
Median debt/income in bankruptcy 34.5% 40.3% (50%) 3.3%
Median debt in bankruptcy $13,700 $16,100 ($19,000) $1,200
Revolving debt/income 5.2% 14.9% (8.5%) 0.001%
Credit card charge-off rate 0.8% 0.5% (1.25%) 15%
For comparison, the actual 1997 data are presented in parentheses. It is
clear that the reduction in transactions costs/rents produces model outcomes
closer to observed changes than reductions in stigma. In the former case,
bankruptcy rates and debt holdings both rise, as the data indicate, while in the
latter, rising bankruptcy rates are associated with extremely low-debt levels in
bankruptcy. In fact, the low transactions cost case appears to match closely
the observed increase in ﬁlings, with an implied annual rate of 0.76 percent—




to 1997, and this feature is related to the fact that households take on far more
debtunderthelow-transactionsregimethaninthedata. Nonetheless,thelower
cost of unsecured borrowing clearly implies forces in a qualitative direction
consistent with the observed changes.9
Conclusion
To the extent that the model presented here delivers counterfactual results
when stigma is reduced, one might conclude that the model is ﬂawed rather
than interpret the results as suggesting that stigma has not dropped. How-
ever, the model is predicated on only a few plausible assumptions regarding
household risk, credit markets, and incomplete insurance markets. Secondly,
it was assumed that households could only imperfectly insure their labor in-
come risk—a reasonable assumption. Thirdly, creditors are assumed to price
9 The last column of Table 7 explores the effects of the elimination of both stigma and
transactions costs. These changes result in bankruptcy rates rising only slightly relative to the
benchmark but also are associated with extremely small debt levels being discharged in bankruptcy.
A possible reason for the fall in debt holdings is that with the elimination of stigma comes a drop
in the cost of borrowing, all else equal. As a result, the incentives to borrow are greater. However,
in equilibrium, the absence of stigma leads borrowers to quite readily ﬁle for bankruptcy and alters
loan rates by enough to reduce equilibrium debt holdings.18 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
loans conditioned only on total debt held by a household. This is a weak
requirement as well, and allowing creditors to have more information would
likely lead to even less bankruptcy, as credit limits would tighten in the face
of negative shocks. Lastly, the decrease in stigma studied here led to coun-
terfactual implications beyond bankruptcy rates, as debt levels fell and credit
limits shrank. It is useful to note that in Athreya (2001), it was assumed that
creditorscouldnotconditiononevendebtholdings. Insteadcreditorsimposed
a ﬁxed credit limit. Even in that environment, reductions in stigma could not
account for observed simultaneous increases in both debt and bankruptcy. It
is apparent that in this model, reductions in stigma have large contractionary
effects on credit supply, and while bankruptcy rates might rise as stigma falls,
the debts discharged in bankruptcy are predicted to shrink dramatically and
not rise over time as they have.
Onamorepositivenote,apromisingexplanationappearstobethatfalling
transactions costs have led to greatly expanded borrowing possibilities. I
found that this view has implications that are consistent with the facts on both
ﬁling rates as well as debt growth over the 1990s. The model did produce
an excessive charge-off rate relative to the debt. Nonetheless, advances in
intermediation, increased competition, and the democratization of credit, to
the extent that they have effectively lowered borrowing costs, have led in this
model to outcomes broadly consistent with the data.
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